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ABSTRACT 
 
The large ultraviolet optical infrared surveyor (LUVOIR) study process has brought to fruition an extremely exciting 
scientific mission concept. The 3.5 year LUVOIR study duration enabled an unprecedented level of scientific, 
engineering, and technology thoroughness prior to the Astro2020 Decadal. This detail also shed light on many 
technical and programmatic challenges for efficiently developing a mission of this scale within the context of 
NASA’s flagships cost and schedule performances to date. While NASA’s flagships perform exquisitely once on-
orbit, there is understandable growing frustration in their development cost and schedule overruns. We felt it 
incumbent upon ourselves to ask how we could improve on delivering LUVOIR (or any of NASA’s future 
flagships) on schedule and on budget, not just for the next mission, but for all NASA large strategic missions to 
come. We researched past and current NASA flagship’s lessons learned publications and other large government 
projects that pointed to some systemic challenges that will only grow with larger and more complex strategic 
missions. Our findings pointed us to some ways that could potentially evolve NASA’s current flagship management 
practices to help improve on their development cost and schedule performance despite their growing complexity. 
This paper briefly comments on the motivations for NASA’s flagships and on the science motivations for a 
LUVOIR-like mission. We argue the incentives for improving NASA’s flagships development cost and schedule 
performance. We review the specific additional challenges of NASA’s flagships to acknowledge their specific 
issues. We then examine the most repeated systemic challenges we found from previous NASA flagships and other 
large government projects lessons learned/observed. Lastly, we offer recommendations to tackle these repeated 
systemic challenges facing NASA’s flagships. The recommendations culminate into a proactive integrated 
development and funding framework to enable improving the execution of NASA’s future flagship’s cost and 
schedule performance.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation for NASA’s flagships: 
 
The more we explore and the more the universe reveals, the more questions unfold. A recent study1 assessed that the 
exploration and scientific return from NASA’s flagship missions are more than worth the effort and cost to 
overcome their challenges, and are critical and required for pursuing the most compelling science questions. NASA 
would be a different agency without the Apollo Program, Voyagers 1 and 2, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 
Chandra, and Cassini, to name a few. Their impact on NASA and humanity are unrivaled compared to any other 
NASA endeavors and their incentives speak for themselves.  
 
1.2  Science motivations for a large, ultraviolet, optical, near-IR space observatory: 
 
One of the basic, fundamental human questions is “Are we alone in the universe?” We have finally reached a point 
in our history where we can build a large space observatory that can directly image “pale blue dots” in other solar 
systems, and spectroscopically characterize the atmospheres of Earth-like planets in the habitable zone around sun-
like stars. This will allow us to search for biosignatures – the signs of life – in our solar neighborhood in a 
statistically meaningful way2, 3-14.  Significant technology advancements2, 3, 6, 7, 15-29 have occurred over the last two 
decades that have brought us to this point. The consensus exoEarth yield analysis over the last several years3-13 
indicates that a telescope aperture of 8m or larger is needed to be able to begin to statistically constrain the 
frequency of life-bearing exoplanets and to make a null-result statistically meaningful. A LUVOIR-like mission will 
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also enable surveying and characterizing hundreds of other types, sizes, and atmospheres of exoplanets around other 
stars that will allow us to begin to put our solar system’s planetary characteristics into context with surrounding 
nearby stars. 
 
In addition to the extraordinary exoplanetary science case, a LUVOIR-like observatory would be able to extend the 
discoveries of the HST to measure a broad array of general astrophysics questions: tracing ionizing light over 
cosmic time, constraining dark matter, the cycles of galactic matter, the multiscale assembly of galaxies, stars as the 
engines of galactic feedback, star and planetary formation, to name a few. Finally, a LUVOIR-like mission would be 
able to remotely image and spectroscopically characterize with the same resolution what many in-situ planetary 
spacecraft in our solar system do3. Only, instead of building a series of mission and spacecraft per planetary body, a 
LUVOIR-like telescope could remotely observe most of the solar system bodies just by repointing. A LUVOIR-like 
mission could observe small bodies in the solar system, and perform comparisons in planetary atmospheres. A 
LUVOIR-like mission enables searching for life and telling the story of life in the universe.  
 
1.3  Motivation to improve NASA’s flagships development cost and schedule performance: 
 
While NASA’s great observatories are world-renowned for their science discoveries1, 28, they are also renowned for 
their cost and schedule overruns during their development10, 28-42. Understandably, the community and all 
stakeholders are growing weary of NASA’s cost and schedule overruns to the point where there are community 
members wondering if NASA’s large strategic missions are worthwhile29. We need to fix this.  Taking action now, 
showing good faith to the community that we recognize this problem and we are willing to do something about it, 
may enable a future that will keep NASA’s flagships discovering answers to known and unknown mysteries30. The 
alternative may be a decreasing (astrophysics/SMD) budget for the foreseeable future.  
 
1.4  Recognizing and acknowledging the issues: 
 
By their nature and intent, each NASA flagship mission is a unique, system-of-systems built to deliver the broadest, 
most desired, scientific measurement capability for the most number of stakeholders. With their pursuit of unrivaled 
science questions, NASA’s flagship missions often demand equally unrivaled technologies never attempted before. 
These technologies help establish the observatory’s architecture.  
 
In addition to challenging technologies, NASA’s flagships have additional challenges above and beyond smaller, 
less complex missions. Flagships are one-off, complex, exquisitely precise space observatories that serve an 
intentional swath of stakeholders because of its tremendous measurement capabilities that cannot be performed with 
smaller-scale missions. They are complex due to the myriad of unique and evolving science questions they are 
trying to answer. The science goals necessitate a given-sized aperture2, 3, 6-8, 11, 13 and multiple, precision, one-off 
instruments must operate in coordination with the telescope as a system3. In addition, the flagship’s science 
instruments themselves are, in their own right, complex. This multifaceted, layered complexity is a result of the 
observatory being a system of systems that has multiple imaging, spectroscopic, and other science capabilities that, 
often, must work in concert with one another to achieve the desired science observations. The nested nature of the 
subsystems necessitates hardware development timing scenarios that require multiple things to be developed in 
parallel. These developments, in turn, drive the schedule of the higher-level integration and test sequences. These 
multiple, necessarily-parallel developments put a strain on resource demands. If the resources are not available to 
enable parallel developments, this, itself, will cause the schedule to be lengthened and therefore, will cause cost and 
schedule overruns. This complexity is warranted in order for a space observatory to provide measurement 
capabilities to answer the most compelling science questions. This inherent, intricate complexity requires us to 
think differently about how to most efficiently and effectively manage and develop flagships.   
 
For illustration, Figure 1 below shows the LUVOIR mission concept’s architecture. Showing it serves two purposes: 
(1) it demonstrates the complexity of a flagship, and specifically, for a LUVOIR-like mission; (2) it defines 
nomenclature that will be used throughout this paper that is good to establish up front. The specific nomenclature 
illustrates the different layers of complexity from the functional decomposition of the hardware starting with the 
mission, its segments, elements, sub-systems, assemblies, and sub-assemblies. Please note that due to page-space 
limitation in the figure, only one segment (the observatory segment) was selected that shows both (all) elements (the 
payload and spacecraft) and their sub-systems. However, only four out of eight sub-systems (the Optical Telescope 
Assembly (OTA), Payload Articulation System (PAS) and spacecraft bus and sunshade) show their assembly and 
sub-assembly level hardware for this illustration. There would be similar nested elements for the ground segment 
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and launch segment, and similarly, there would be assembly and subassembly items for each of the payload 
instruments (subsystems). 
 
LUVOIR Architecture 
 
 
Figure 1: LUVOIR architecture showing the nomenclature of the different hardware layers of LUVOIR’s mission 
showing the segments and a subset of the elements, subsystems, assemblies, and subassemblies. For the payload 
element, the subsystems are the OTA, the four instruments and the PAS. 
 
As a result of our research on NASA flagship missions27-60 and several Department of Defense (DoD) large 
projects61-70, this paper focuses on some repeatedly-documented systemic challenges and offers alternative strategies 
that could lead to NASA significantly improving on cost and schedule performance if implemented. Most of these 
are within the project manager’s control to implement. We want to acknowledge that some NASA project managers 
have recognized some of these challenges, and implemented methods to mitigate these challenges on their own 
initiative on their individual projects. In these cases, there have been individual large missions that have successfully 
delivered their missions on schedule and on cost. However, some projects follow the current NASA guidance that 
doesn’t always work out for delivering flagships on cost and schedule. This paper describes nine lessons that can be 
implemented by the project. 
 
In addition, there is one repeated lesson “observed” that cannot be addressed by the project. This lesson has been 
repeatedly documented by a vast array of experts and experiences from scientists, engineers, technologists, 
managers and analysts that have worked directly on NASA’s flagship and other large NASA space flight missions 
over the decades. This is the issue of cost estimating and funding stability. We discuss where NASA contrasts with 
other government large projects and even two of NASA’s past missions, and we make recommendations that would 
provide the project the stable funding it needs to execute an optimized schedule while also giving stakeholders 
control they want.  
 
1.5  Goal of this paper: 
 
Our goal is to bring to light the current NASA flagship systemic challenges and issues at the project-level and 
Agency/Congressional-level. We make recommendations on how to mitigate these challenges and remove current 
barriers with effective and efficient management practices for executing the development of NASA’s flagships. We 
advocate that these recommendations be considered to build upon and evolve NASA’s current best management 
practices into what we are calling an ‘integrated development and funding framework’. In doing so, this may 
significantly improve on NASA’s flagship cost and schedule performance. We want NASA to continue to be known 
for its flagships and great observatories in the future so that NASA can lead the way in “civilization-class science”30.  
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This paper offers key strategies that are believed to be critical to efficiently formulate, manage, and implement any 
NASA flagship, not just LUVOIR.   
 
2. SYSTEMIC-CHALLENGES, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING NASA’S STRATEGIC “FLAGSHIP” MISSIONS  
 
For reference, Figure 2 below shows NASA’s development lifecycle for all space flight missions as taken from the 
May 2019 Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees on NASA Assessments of 
Major Projects31. 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  NASA’s development lifecycle for all space flight missions 
 
The mission phasing for NASA’s space flight missions consists of two broad categories: (1) Formulation and (2) 
Implementation.  
• Formulation consists of Pre-Phase A, Phase A and Phase B. Pre-Phase A currently consists of concept 
studies. The Astro2020 Decadal four large mission concept study teams (HabEx, LUVOIR, Lynx, and 
OST)71-73 have achieved concept maturity level 4 (CML4)73 as a result of significant investment across 
NASA, academia, industry, and international contributions to all four studies. Phase A consists of concept 
design and technology development, and Phase B consists of a preliminary design, requirements 
completed, and all technology development completed to TRL 6 by the mission’s preliminary design 
review (PDR).  
• Implementation consists of Phases C-F. Under NASA’s current guidelines, Phase C consists of completing 
the final design and fabrication of all hardware. Within Phase C is the critical design review (CDR) and the 
system integration review (SIR). Phase D consists of system assembly, integration and test (I&T), launch, 
and commissioning. Phase E consists of the mission’s on-orbit operations and collection of data. Finally, 
Phase F is closing out the mission. 
 
2.1 Recommended project-level management strategies for NASA’s flagships 
 
The following nine management strategies can be implemented at the project-level. 
 
2.1.1 Early technology development  
 
NASA flagship technology management challenges:  In section 1.4 of this paper, we laid out some of the 
additional challenges above and beyond what smaller NASA projects encounter. Due to the additional complexity of 
NASA’s flagships, there are additional challenges these projects face upon trying to execute the mission under 
 5 
NASA’s current space flight mission lifecycle. These challenges are corroborated by the findings from our research 
on NASA’s flagships published lessons learned/observed.  
 
We researched many large NASA flagship lessons learned documents1, 27-29, 31-60. “Late” technology development is 
repeatedly referred to as a source of cost and schedule overruns. Some past missions knew that waiting to develop 
technologies through mission PDR was too risky and chose to develop them sooner. Some missions developed their 
technologies sooner than required, being one of several reasons enabling the mission’s successful cost and schedule 
performance38. Developing technologies earlier than required is not the only contributor to some missions 
successfully completing their mission’s development on cost and on schedule, however, earlier technology 
development is a big factor for lowering risk as explained below. The fact that NASA allows technologies to 
develop to TRL6 through mission preliminary design review (PDR) gives the project the discretion to decide when 
to develop technologies as they see fit within the current NASA rules. For flagship missions in particular or other 
large projects with multiple instruments, the consequences of this “late” technology development are exacerbated 
due to the additional complexity and extent of nested and interconnected subsystems and assemblies.  
 
A requirement for getting to mission PDR is that all lower levels of assembly including all segments, elements, and 
subsystems must hold their PDRs first, as shown in Figure 3. Given this nested nature of flagship observatories, 
there is a “season of PDRs” that may stretch out over a period of years. Note that all PDRs occurs towards the end of 
any product’s Phase B whether it is at the subsystem-, element-, segment- or mission-level. When subsystem PDRs 
occur significantly out in front of the mission-level PDR, then it is likely that these subsystems have started to 
fabricate hardware and even begin integration and testing before the mission-level PDR is held.  If there is a 
technology that is not able to mature by mission PDR in one subsystem, this could throw the project back years in 
development. Additionally, this may have wasted some hardware developments in both time (labor) and resources. 
Given some of the interconnections between subsystems, this could also throw other subsystems back years as well.  
 
To highlight this point, Figure 3 below shows the offset nature of different levels of PDRs for nested products for 
LUVOIR. Consider the OTA for example. In this schedule, the OTA PDR occurs ~3 years before the mission-level 
PDR. If projects are allowed to develop hardware to TRL6 up until mission PDR, some subsystems, assemblies, and 
subassemblies may have already been fabricated, integrated, aligned, and tested well before mission PDR occurs. If 
a subsystem’s technology doesn’t develop and a different solution/technology needs to be swapped in and used 
(currently allowed through mission PDR), there are serious risks to having to potentially restart considerable 
portions of the design cycle all over again sending the project back years in its development lifecycle. It is also 
important to recognize that the skilled-personnel (“marching army”) increases deliberately and substantively 
between Phase A to Phase B. 
 
DoD large project technology management issues 
Interestingly, NASA is not unique to cost and schedule overruns due to infusing undeveloped technologies into 
incomplete designs and then finding out the consequences when they don’t develop as expected. The Department of 
Defense large projects have also encountered similar lessons learned/observed, regarding “late” technology 
development69, 70 . In 2018, the U.S. Navy’s development of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier, was originally capped to cost $10.5B (FY07) and breached $13.027B. The Navy fully attributed 
these cost overruns to immature technologies and an incomplete design. “CVN 78 began construction with immature 
technologies and an incomplete design, leading to cost and schedule growth,” the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office noted in an April report.”69  
 
NASA flagship technology management recommendations:  As a result of the compounding and cascading 
effects of cost and schedule growth if there are any “late” technology developments on a complex, nested NASA 
flagship, we recommend that flagships mature all technologies to TRL6 before starting Phase A, and not by mission 
PDR. 
 
2.1.2 Managing flagship complexity with earlier requirements definition 
 
Flagship requirements management challenge:  Findings from our research cite that any changes28, 31-40, 42 to 
science requirements after a baseline cost and schedule have been assessed, cause an increase in the development 
schedule. These changes force the new requirements to be flowed down to all aspects of the mission that are 
impacted. These changes may place additional requirements on hardware that was already defined in the baseline. 
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This hardware may need changes made to their design in order to meet the new requirements. This is in addition to 
the potential need to build and test any new hardware or even take hardware away. Any of these aspects of 
requirements changes after a baseline has been established adds additional time to the mission. Adding time while 
there is a marching army will increase the cost and schedule of any mission. In the meantime, some community 
members are holding the mission accountable to the Decadal timeframe cost estimate which did not account for 
changes to the requirements.   
 
 
Figure 3: The LUVOIR-A Schedule Phasing shows where the mission PDR is relative to lower level sub-assembly 
phasing. This demonstrates the offset and nested nature of lower-level (subsystem) product PDRs that feed into higher-
levels of assembly.  
 
Additionally, allowing multiple assembly- or subsystem- level requirements to stay open in the form of “to be 
reviewed” (TBRs) and “to be determined” (TBDs) through a flagship’s segment or mission PDR can have the same 
effect as a technology not maturing as expected. Alternately, completing the design of an assembly before the design 
of its parent subsystem may place unwelcome constraints on the higher levels of assembly. These types of late 
design completions or changes will lengthen the project’s development schedule, and hence, force cost and schedule 
overruns35, 42, 69.   
 
Furthermore, when partners are onboard with contracts in place (industry, academia) there are at least two types of 
issues with late requirements definition or late requirements changes: (1) a mission with incomplete interface control 
requirements with TBRs and TBDs can increase the cost and schedule of those products due to late completion of 
requirements or late modifications; and (2) late changes to designs already under contract can force changes on other 
subsystems, thus increasing the cost and schedule of other contracts as well.  These are all examples of the negative 
consequences that late completion of a mission’s requirements or late changes to a mission’s requirements can cause 
cost and schedule overruns in multiple manifested ways.   
 
Flagship’s requirements management recommendation:  As a result of the compounding and cascading effects 
due to late completion of requirements or late changes to requirements on a complex, nested, flagship mission, we 
recommend that flagships can help manage this complexity by developing and defining all requirements down to the 
or if requirements change. 
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subsystem level early in Phase A so that requests for procurement (RFPs) can be released at the subsystem level (see 
Sections 2.1.6; 2.1.7; 2.1.8; and 4 of this paper).  
 
As part of the release of the subsystem RFPs in Phase A, requirements need to include clear interface requirements, 
complete performance requirements, acceptance testing requirements, and expected institutional rules to be followed 
(See Section 2.1.8) upon delivery to the next higher level of integration for integration and testing (I&T). This 
enables partners to develop and follow their own internal processes. Partners would be expected and required to 
flow down, define, and establish all requirements within their subsystem down to the assembly, sub-assembly and 
component level also in Phase A.  
 
After all requirements have been established and defined in Phase A, all efforts should be made to prevent mission 
creep and scope changes28, 34, 35, 42 (See Section 4.3.1 of this paper). 
 
2.1.3 Managing flagship complexity with pathfinders 
 
Flagship first-of-a-kind, one-off management challenges:  Findings from our research as well as personal 
experiences on flagship space flight project hardware developments indicate that, in all cases where engineering 
breadboards, pathfinders, engineering development units (EDUs), and engineering test units (ETUs) were used, 
multiple issues were discovered, some of which would not have been discovered until the higher-level of assembly35, 
41, 57, 59. The time and resources invested to develop and learn about these in the early years saved significant time 
and resources than if they had been discovered during I&T on the critical path on the flight unit. Different types of 
practice units enabled, and ultimately, saved on their mission’s cost and schedule performance28, 32-60. These units 
allowed the team to catch early what would have been disasters if caught late during system-level I&T. Successful 
units were used on the JWST OTA Pathfinder41, Cassini engineering breadboards and ETUs52-59, and Chandra35. In 
all cases, they help inform designs and realistic tolerances, find design flaws, help layout test procedures and 
sequences, and help train and provide rehearsals for personnel. 
 
Flagship first-of-a-kind, one-off management recommendations:  During Pre-Phase A, the team should 
judiciously and strategically identify and plan out which types of practice units are needed on which pieces of 
critical hardware. Some will be used to inform the designs, (i.e., error budget alignment allocation reality checks), 
while others will be used to inform test procedures, handling, integration, alignment, and even cleaning procedures. 
Others will be used to check out ground support equipment (GSE) and eventually, some will be high-fidelity units 
(ETUs) used to simulate the function of the eventual flight hardware to validate the designs, requirements, and 
interfaces. Judicious selection and development of engineering breadboards, pathfinders, EDUs and ETUs are 
critical for effectively managing complex flagships.  
 
2.1.4 Managing flagship complexity with modular design 
 
Flagship complexity management challenges:  Past published NASA lessons learned41 have indicated that there 
are two challenges associated with flagships where modularity would have helped:  
1. Flagships have additional challenges during I&T in terms of hardware accessibility. Embedded 
components, subassemblies, assemblies, and subsystems can be difficult to access if hardware anomalies 
occur. If hardware needs to be accessed and tested, or worse, swapped out with flight spares, without a 
modular design, this can add unnecessary time during peak marching army levels while the development is 
on the critical path41. In addition to being difficult to access, trying to reach hardware that was not meant to 
be accessed can place nearby hardware at risk of being bumped (misaligned) or damaged. Although it may 
take additional time on the front end, designing a mission to be modular upfront can lower schedule and 
hardware risk during I&T.   
2. A 2010 public law [ Public Law 111-267-Oct. 11, 2010 124 Stat. 2833] has strong language about future 
observatory-class scientific spacecraft to be serviceable. It is stated here for ease to the reader: 
“SEC. 804. IN-SPACE SERVICING. 
 
The Administrator shall continue to take all necessary steps to ensure that provisions are made for in-
space or human servicing and repair of all future observatory-class scientific spacecraft intended to be 
deployed in Earth-orbit or at a Lagrangian point to the extent practicable and appropriate. The 
Administrator should ensure that agency investments and future capabilities for space technology, 
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robotics, and human space flight take the ability to service and repair these spacecraft into account, 
where appropriate, and incorporate such capabilities into design and operational plans. 
 
SEC. 805. DECADAL RESULTS. 
 
NASA shall take into account the current decadal surveys from the National Academies’ Space Studies 
Board when submitting the President’s budget request to the Congress.” 
Hubble was designed to be serviceable, and it did incorporate a modular design32, 36, 37, 39, 47. This design aspect was 
critical to enabling the five servicing missions on HST that replaced instruments, gyros, and many other hardware to 
give HST its successful longevity and increasing science performance each time it was serviced and upgraded. 
Ambitiously, astronauts even replaced circuit boards within the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) 
instrument. In order to access inside the instrument, the astronauts had to unscrew 111 screws to open the instrument 
cover of the STIS instrument47. 
 
A third benefit to designing a mission to be modular is designing in robust interfaces such that for a large 
observatory such as LUVOIR, being able to detach certain grouped hardware can ease transportation issues to I&T 
facilities or to the launch site. If designed to be modular from the start, proper interface requirements and 
performance requirements can be specified to enable repeated disassembly and reassembly at certain interfaces. A 
pathfinder could demonstrate the alignment repeatability of such interfaces. One example of this would be designing 
the OTA wing folds3 to be repeatably assembled, disassembled, then reassembled. Making each instrument modular 
and independently accessible is another example. Other examples would be making the spacecraft with orbital 
replacement units (ORUs) for the various spacecraft hardware functions3.  
 
Flagship complexity management recommendations:  Although designing a mission to be modular is not 
required to achieve the science goals, doing so lowers risk on the critical path during I&T by making hardware more 
readily accessible, lowers risk to nearby hardware, it can ease transportation requirements, and it can enable science 
beyond the prime mission by making instruments and other levels of assembly serviceable. During Pre-Phase A, the 
team should design the mission to be modular and assess the degree of modularity that would be optimal for 
different aspects of the mission. These trades should occur in Pre-Phase A. 
  
2.1.5 Managing the duration of a flagship’s development schedule by enabling parallel 
manufacturing, integration, & I&T  
 
Flagship development schedule management challenges:  With a large mission like LUVOIR where there are 
multiples of tens of things (for instance, the number of primary mirror segment assemblies (PMSAs) – ranging 
between 55 to 120 for the two currently envisioned LUVOIR optical telescope assembly (OTA) point designs)3, 
fabricating, assembling, integrating, and testing them serially would stretch out the schedule to an unacceptable 
degree. Developing the payload serially and then the spacecraft serially would also stretch out the schedule, thus 
forcing cost and schedule overruns. Developing subsystems in parallel enables the shortest possible schedule for the 
development of the mission when it has peak marching army numbers. Of course, the funding recommendations 
outlined in Section 4.3 of this paper are necessary to enable these parallel element and subsystem developments. The 
IMS carefully plans out the timing of when to start and finish each product so that they all shows up when needed 
for each level of I&T.  
 
Flagship development schedule management recommendations:  In order to optimize the schedule and make it 
as efficient and effective as possible which also lowers the overall cost of the development of the mission3, 42, 74, 75, 
many aspects of the mission need to be executed in parallel3, 10, 28, 42, 74, 75. Enabling parallel processes (such as with 
the PMSAs) has other benefits as well (See Section 2.1.9 of this paper). Time should be spent in Pre-Phase A to map 
out the IMS and identify which things need to be developed in parallel and how many identical operations should 
take place at any given time. This will also provide other important long-term planning aspects such as parallel 
integration, I&T, and the types of facilities that need to have multiple-of’s, such as mirror fabrication facilities, 
polishing and coating facilities, etc. In addition, a cost-benefit-risk analysis should be done on the overall cost of 
performing different aspects of the mission in parallel vs. serially. 
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2.1.6 Managing flagships with acquisition and partner strategies 
 
Flagship acquisition and partner strategy management challenges:  With large, one-off, complex NASA 
flagships there are several issues with competing the entire management of the mission development to a single 
prime contractor. Rather than state all of the challenges, we state the recommendations and benefits for enabling the 
government to act as the “prime”. 
 
Flagship acquisition and partner strategy management recommendations:  We recommend that the government 
act as the “prime contractor” (or “prime”) on large flagship missions. There are many benefits: 
a. NASA sets and keeps control of the requirements early in Phase A, including coordinating any changes to 
requirements across multiple interfaces and across many partners. 
b. Earlier requirements definition enables the government setting the interface requirements at the 
procurement level including setting the acceptance performance metrics, delivery schedules, and 
institutional rules that will be followed at the next higher level of assembly. 
c. With NASA acting as the prime and with earlier requirements definition, this allows bringing multiple 
partners onboard earlier via smaller contracts that align directly with each partner’s area of expertise. They 
can focus on areas where they excel.  
d. NASA is able to select the “best in class” provider at the subsystem level.  
e. NASA retains expertise by being the systems integrator. This is critical for growing and maintaining 
systems engineering which is one of NASA’s core competencies. 
f. Negotiating international roles is an inherently governmental role. As with all past flagship missions, 
international partners will continue to want to invest and contribute to them. 
 
Earlier partner involvement can occur in two ways: (1) In Pre-Phase A, multiple partners can be funded through 
broad agency announcements (BAAs) to leverage external expertise in technology developments; (2) In early Phase 
A, after the government has defined all requirements and interfaces to the subsystem level, multiple, Requests for 
Procurement (RFPs) can be openly competed for those subsystems since those requirements have been clearly 
defined. After partners have been awarded the development of subsystems, partners can then develop and follow 
their own internal processes. Partners would then be required to flow down, define, and establish all requirements 
within their subsystem down to the assembly, sub-assembly and component level also in Phase A. Establishing 
requirements early and bringing partners onboard earlier enables broader and earlier buy-in. 
 
2.1.7 Managing flagships with institutional requirements  
 
Flagship institutional requirements management challenges:  With multiple partners come multiple unique 
institutions with perfectly valid internal processes and institutional rules and requirements to follow. This scenario, 
however, does inherently and potentially create conundrums as to which institutional rules should be followed 
during I&T for handling, I&T procedures, etc. at each successive level of integration and testing at different 
institutions.  
 
Flagship institutional requirements management recommendations:  We recommend that rules be established 
upfront as part of the RFP. The call for proposals should define all performance requirements, interface 
requirements, test requirements, and expected rules to be followed at each higher level of integration. The 
development and flow down of the requirements and interface definitions to the subsystems should occur in early 
Phase A. 
 
2.1.8 Managing flagships with an integrated, ‘one-team’ environment 
 
Flagship integrated, ‘one-team’ environment management challenges:  With the need for broad and multiple 
partners on flagships, partners can be rightfully stove-piped developments. However, when there are anomalies, the 
project would benefit from having expertise from across the team help solve anomalies. Fresh perspectives can help 
solve issues, but only if they know about them in time to be effective.   
 
Flagship integrated, ‘one-team’ environment management recommendations:  It is beneficial to the execution 
and efficiency of the project to allow cross-fertilization of expertise to help address issues when they arise. The 
government needs to figure out a way to protect the intellectual property rights of partners and federal regulations 
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governing International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR) while 
also rewarding individuals and entities for helping to solve issues when they arise. 
 
2.1.9 Managing flagships with team, experience, and depth 
 
Flagship team, experience, and depth management challenges: Findings from our research as well as personal 
experiences cite that project managers that have never built space flight hardware do not have the necessary 
experience to anticipate, and therefore, head off known challenges and risks.  
 
Separately, in order to enable parallel processes as described in section 2.1.5 of this paper, it is too risky to have a 
single subject matter expert (SME) for developing products.  
 
Flagship team, experience, and depth management recommendations: Findings from our research as well as 
personal experience necessitates that critical project leadership roles be filled with individuals with relevant space 
flight hardware development experience. There is no substitute for experience.  
 
To enable parallel developments, there needs to be a minimum of two SMEs for the development of parallel 
processes where either could lead the development of that product. This could be a more experienced individual and 
a less experienced individual that gets mentored by the more experienced individual.  
 
3.0  COST ESTIMATION AND FUNDING CHALLENGES 
 
There are two funding issues that present challenges to efficiently and effectively managing NASA’s flagships 
discussed in this section: (3.1) Cost estimating challenges, i.e., knowing how much funding a given flagship needs, 
and (3.2) challenges related to disbursing the funds to the flagship project.  
 
3.1 Cost estimating challenges for managing flagships  
 
Historically, NASA has struggled with estimating the final cost and schedule duration of its flagship missions. 
Given that NASA’s science flagship missions are prioritized by the National Academy of Sciences Decadal process 
(“Decadal”) cost estimates are a significant part of the consideration when priorities are established. Cost estimates 
near a mission’s Decadal have been used historically as their bench mark cost. Mission concepts are immature at the 
time of the Decadal. They are immature because their science requirements are not settled, their technologies have 
not been developed, and their architecture and design are not well-defined. Immature concepts beget immature cost 
estimates. 
 
3.2 Funding disbursement challenges for managing flagships  
 
Congress appropriates NASA’s and NASA’s flagship budgets on an annual basis. Funding issues are manifested in 
two ways: funding profile and stable funding. 
1. Historically, the way NASA’s next, newly prioritized flagship is funded occurs in correlation with the previous-
prioritized flagship mission’s development. When the previous flagship nears launch, a “budget wedge” opens 
up. Each year, the budget wedge may gradually increase depending on the success of the previous flagship’s 
development. Assuming it is successful, in any given annual appropriation, the budget wedge for the new 
flagship is usually based on what budget is available rather than on what the project needs. It’s like an 
allowance. Meanwhile, the management of NASA’s flagships initially optimize their mission’s development 
schedule into an integrated master schedule (IMS) by intending and planning to develop the necessary products 
in parallel for the most efficient schedule, and hence, the lowest cost overall. The IMS is a well-thought out 
management plan used to designate the total time needed to develop (design, procure, fabricate, integrate, align, 
and test) each level of assembly from components through systems (including funded schedule reserve) for each 
product development. Given the nested nature of flagships, the IMS also plans out the timing of when lower 
levels of assemblies need to be delivered to be integrated into the next higher level of assembly. The timing of 
the completion and arrival of each product for the next level of integration is critical to control cost and 
schedule overruns. If a lower level assembly is not ready when required for integration into the higher level 
assembly, the higher-level assembly must wait for the lower-level assembly to be completed, delivered, and go 
through acceptance testing. An IMS is optimized to minimize the total duration of the development lifecycle 
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when the marching army has peaked in numbers. Minimizing the total duration with a well-timed and executed 
IMS (development plan) helps save on the total mission cost. If the funding profile (total amount of money in a 
given annually appropriated year) disbursed to a flagship’s project is less than needed to execute the multiple 
parallel developments as planned in the project’s IMS, then the project must defer work28, 41, 42, 74-75. Deferring 
work has cascading and compounding consequences on a complex flagship’s development. It lengthens the 
overall schedule while there is a marching army. The work still must be completed. Thus, as long as any 
necessarily-parallel product developments are forced to be deferred due to funding issues, NASA flagships will 
continue to incur cost and schedule overruns under this scenario. This has been cited as one of the biggest 
systemic challenges to managing flagships3, 28, 34, 41, 42, 61-68, 74-75. 
 
2. Again, NASA and NASA’s flagships receive annual appropriations from Congress. Continuing resolutions 
(CRs) force a status quo budget level equal to the previous year’s budget. Hence, even planned increases in a 
flagship’s budget are prohibited until a budget is passed by Congress. Congress has passed a NASA budget on-
time only 7 times in the history of NASA28. Continuing resolutions are the norm and can be expected. CRs are 
yet another manifestation of forcing a project to defer. 
 
There is precedence with two of NASA’s historical programs/projects that were fully-funded* by Congress28, 42. 
These were the Apollo program and the ‘Return to Flight’ development of the space shuttle Endeavour after the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster.  Congress also has a variety of full-funding mechanisms for other branches of the 
government (See Section 4.0 of this paper). It appears that with proper motivation, Congress and NASA recognize 
the significance and positive impact of a full-funding* policy. (*See Section 4.1 for a description of a full-funding 
policy). 
 
4.0 RECOMMENDED FUTURE NASA FLAGSHIP FUNDING STRATEGY 
 
Before addressing the recommendations, some awareness and context is needed. In this section, we see the array of 
full-funding mechanisms that have been available to the Department of Defense for their large projects since the 
1950s and continue today. 
 
4.1 DoD large project lessons for NASA: DoD’s full-funding policy  
 
Full-Funding Definition: All funds are appropriated up front or on an incremental basis that enables a project to 
execute their Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). In other words, all funding is received when it is needed. 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has benefited from Congress’ full funding policy for many of its large DoD 
projects such as aircraft carriers, fighter jets, helicopters, and submarines, etc. since the 1950s. Also since the 1950s, 
the DoD, for the majority of time, has not had to develop their large flagships with Congressional annual 
appropriations. Therefore, they typically don’t have to worry about funding stability. The DoD’s large projects 
continue to benefit from a variety of full-funding policy mechanisms today. The branch of Congress that funds the 
DoD understands that incrementally funding their projects annually could cause severe cost and schedule overrun 
impacts to these national assets. The only lessons learned they argue about openly in documentation is which full-
funding policy is best61-68.  The range of full-funding policy methods afforded to large DoD projects include (1) No-
year funding, (2) Incremental Funding, (3) Multiyear Procurement, (4) Block Buy Contracting, (5) Economic Order 
Quantity, and (6) Advanced Procurement to name some of them.  Congress has recognized for ~70 years the merit 
of fully-funding these national assets because they also understand the consequences if they don’t3, 28, 42, 61-70, 74, 75.  
 
Full Funding Policy Methods/Options Available to DoD Large Projects61-68  
Brief definitions are provided for each full-funding method below: 
 
• No-year (Zero-year) Funding61-68: All funding for building/developing DoD large projects is appropriated 
all at once in a single lump sum before starting the development. 
 
• Incremental Funding61-68: The funding for building DoD large projects is appropriated in 2 or more year 
increments, typically ~2-5 years, and in amounts that do not limit long-lead items being purchased or does 
not limit the development of anything due to lack of funding in a given year. In other words, this is still 
front-loaded funding. However, each year requires an appropriation bill to be passed by Congress. 
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• Multiyear Procurement (MYP), Block Buy Contracting (BBC), and Economic Order Quantity 
Authority65: 
Multiyear procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting (BBC) are contract funding mechanisms that 
allow a certain percentage of savings, sometimes less than 5% to sometimes greater than 15%, over the 
traditional contracts that require annual renewal by Congress by allowing a single contract to be valid for 
several years’ worth of funding without having to renew the contract each year. This is allowed or a limited 
number of defense acquisition programs. 
 
• Multiyear Procurement (MYP)65 
Under a MYP contract, a single contract requires congressional approval in the first year that enables stable 
funding for two to five years’ worth of procurement without requiring Congressional annual renewal in the 
following years. MYPs must be approved in both a DoD appropriations act and a non-DoD appropriations 
act. However, to qualify for an MYP contract, a program must meet legal criteria according to statute, 10 
U.S.C. 2306b. 
 
• Block Buy Contracting (BBC)65 
BBC also requires congressional approval for a single contract in the first year for several 
years’ worth of procurement, however, it is more flexible for several reasons, namely: 
a) There’s no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. 
b) BBC only needs to be approved in a single appropriations act. 
c) There are no legal criteria required to qualify for a BBC (because there is no statute governing its 
use). 
d) A BBC can cover more than five years of planned procurement. 
e) BBCs are less likely to include cancellation penalties. 
 
• Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) Authority65 
This provides the authority to allow a few select “long-lead” items to be procured in the first or second year 
usually for “batch items”. 
 
• Advance Procurement (AP) Funding65-67 
This provides the authority to disburse funds one or two years prior to the procurement of the entire system 
usually for long lead items for that system. The amount disbursed in an AP is subtracted from the full 
system procurement appropriation. It is similar to EOQ acquisitions.  
 
4.2  Differences between DoD’s large projects and NASA’s flagships 
 
Fully-funding NASA flagships with a no-year funding policy would be ideal, however, it is not realistic.  
 
The DoD has the benefit of having a better understanding of the costs to build and develop their large projects, 
because they typically build “multiple-of-things” for each thing (aircraft carriers, submarines, fighter jets, etc.) and 
they have been building them (or similar ones with technology upgrades or other relatively small variations) for ~ 70 
years. Therefore, not only do they have a much better understanding of how much it costs to build each thing, they 
have lots of historical data on the actual ranges of costs, how much the costs vary, and the impacts of introducing 
new technologies for each thing. 
 
On the other hand, NASA’s flagships are one-off, state-of-the-art, precision space observatories. Accurate final cost 
and schedule estimates are not possible at the time of NASA science decadals, because for any newly prioritized 
flagship, it has never been built before. Therefore, there is not a database of historical costs for one just like it even if 
there may be some similarities. Additionally, it has low TRL technologies, the requirements are changing, and they 
are bound to change some more before the final decision on the final design.  
 
4.3  Recommended funding strategy:  
 
We recommend a NASA-DoD “hybrid incremental full-funding” policy that reconciles the need for a NASA 
flagship to develop multiple products in parallel in order to minimize the overall cost and schedule, while also 
allowing stakeholders to keep control of the potential for runaway costs and provide pre-established “smaller” 
amounts of funding that span several years. Importantly, the funding would not be on an annual basis. Specifically, 
we propose that NASA’s flagship projects be incrementally, fully-funded and executed in discrete blocks of work 
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that align with the project’s development product milestones and schedule. Each funding block is defined by a gate, 
called a Funding Decision Point (FDP), where the decision is made to fund the next block of work. These are 
separate from NASA’s Key Decision Points (KDPs) that align with the mission phases. For each funding block, the 
project receives all of the necessary funding - only for that funding block – before that block of work is initiated.  
 
At each FDP, four things occur: 
1. The project must demonstrate that the current funding block has been completed and has successfully achieved 
all of its milestones.  
2. At the end of each successfully completed funding block, new cost, risk, and schedule estimates are performed 
by an independent cost and risk estimating entity for (A) the  remainder of the mission’s development, and (B) 
the amount of funding needed for the next funding block only.  
3. The project generates a high-fidelity budget request for the next block of work to be completed, and the 
independent cost estimating entity independently validates it. As the project’s design matures and converges 
through formulation, the cost and schedule estimates will become more accurate. 
4. NASA decides to commit to funding only the next block of work, based on the budget request, updated cost 
estimate, and project success. 
 
We recommend six distinct funding blocks for a project’s lifecycle where each block is fully funded one at a time. 
Five of these funding blocks occur within a NASA flight project’s development formulation period (Pre-Phase A 
through Phase B). In Figure 4 below, the right-hand column, “Decision Point Criteria”, states the criteria for being 
approved to enter that row’s funding block. So, for instance, to pass into Funding Block 1, Start of Pre-Phase A, the 
mission must be prioritized by the Decadal. To get into Funding Block 2, the start of Phase A, all technologies must 
be demonstrated to TRL 6 at the system level, and so on.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Funding blocks and funding decision points (FDPs) and their criteria.  
 
Figure 5 below shows the funding blocks in the context of LUVOIR-A’s development schedule. Each funding block 
covers the work and products needed to be fully funded to implement the optimized IMS. For LUVOIR, the funding 
blocks line up as shown in Figure 5 below: 
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Figure 5: This shows funding blocks in the context of LUVOIR-A’s development schedule. Each funding block covers 
the work and products needed to be fully funded to implement the optimized IMS. 
 
4.4  Discrete Funding Block Advantages: 
 
There are several advantages to this funding block approach outlined above compared to the current method 
NASA’s flagships are funded and executed: 
1. As the mission progresses through mission formulation (Pre-Phase A through Phase B), the mission 
design develops, matures, and becomes more detailed and complete. By assessing the mission cost and 
risk at each funding decision point (FDP), the accuracy of each succeeding cost estimate becomes more 
accurate. The independent costing entity can signal runaway cost growth outside the error bars of the 
previous FDP.  
2. Congress and NASA need only commit to funding the next block of work; not the full mission. Each 
FDP provides the opportunity to delay, augment or deny the next block of funding in response to 
inadequate project development performance, unacceptable cost growth or adjustments to science scope  
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3. Fully-funding each block of work up front, enables the project to execute all of the required parallel 
developments and not have to defer any work due to the funding profile. An equal and additional benefit 
to fully-funding each block of work allows the project to use reserves for their intended purpose: 
unavoidable and inevitable unknown unknowns that will be revealed as the development progresses and 
not to try to use reserves to execute pieces of deferred work while there is a marching army waiting for a 
product to show up. 
4. This funding method lowers the risk of cost overruns on the flagship mission. It also lowers the risk of 
potential flagship overruns negatively impacting other projects and priorities. While cost overruns within 
astrophysics don’t generally impact smaller projects, this would help insure to the community 
(perception or potential reality) that this would not happen since the funding block is fully-funded 
upfront and kept in a different “effective silo”. Since each funding block is discrete with “shorter-term” 
milestones and goals, there is less likelihood that the project would experience cost overruns compared to 
today’s NASA flagship funding method. Again, since the Agency would be committing to fund only one 
funding block at a time, this would provide stakeholders the opportunity at any FDP to delay, cancel, or 
make any other adjustments. 
 
4.5  Individual funding block’s milestones and exit criteria:  
 
Each funding block’s milestones and exit criteria are described below. Within each funding block, proactive 
management strategies are incorporated to address and overcome the systemic-challenges described in Section 2 of 
this paper. 
 
4.5.1  Funding Block 1:  Pre-Phase A milestones and exit criteria: 
 
We recommend a strong Pre-Phase A project office be established to address many of the systemic-challenges 
facing previous NASA flagships as described in Section 2 of this paper, namely, earlier technology development, 
earlier establishment of science objectives and requirements, an architecture that coalesces around the science 
requirements and technologies, and long-term planning for facilities, the verification and validation approach, I&T, 
etc.78  
 
There are several advantages to executing these activities in Pre-Phase A: 
1. A substantially smaller “marching army” is needed in Pre-Phase A to develop and define the science 
objectives and requirements, develop the technologies and the architecture while strategically planning out 
the verification and validation approach, I&T approach and requirements, and other long-term 
considerations3. Doing this in Pre-Phase A reduces overall cost and schedule risk to the entire development 
of the mission. 
2. The “right-sized army” is utilized for each block of work making the resources more effective and 
efficiently used. 
3. Developing technologies to TRL6 in Pre-Phase A reduces cost and schedule risk for all later development 
phases:   
a. Reduces risk that the architecture will change.  
b. Reduces risk that the design will change.  
c. Reduces risk that the science requirements will change. 
d. Reduces risk that requirements will change and minimizes the number of TBRs and TBDs 
e. Reduces risk that interface requirements will change, thus, minimizing changes to contracts. 
4. Maturing technologies off the critical path when there isn’t a large marching army waiting, is worth it by 
itself. The labor grows deliberately and substantively from Phase A to B and through D. 
5. Concurrently developing technologies consistent with a specific architecture ensures that hardware does not 
have to be re-engineered, reaffirming early technology development.   
 
There are three main Pre-Phase A exit criteria (A through C) activities described below. 
 
A. Technology Development:   A small technology team will work with NASA HQ to release Broad Agency 
Announcements (BAAs) so that NASA, industry, and academia can work together (or independently) to 
advance (competing) technologies. In either case, involving all expertise will help get to a developed and 
successful mission sooner. The exit criteria for Pre-Phase A is to develop all technologies to TRL 6 at the 
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component, subsystem, and system level. This needs to include subscale system demonstrations where there are 
two types, namely:  
a. Those where the size of the demonstration is smaller in scale (some smaller ratio of the size of the 
system-level technology to demonstrate the function and its performance (an example for LUVOIR 
might be a smaller sunshade deployment demonstration). 
b. Those where the technology is full-size (full-scale), however, fewer items are used in the 
demonstration (an example for LUVOIR might be the use of three, four, or five full-sized primary 
mirror segment assemblies (PMSAs)3, to enable a system demonstration.  
 
B. Science Definition:  Establish a funded science steering committee (SSC) led by community members to be 
maintained throughout the project’s lifecycle. The SSC will be responsible for interpreting the Decadal 
recommendations and defining the science objectives for the mission. Throughout Pre-Phase A, the SSC will:  
a. Work with the engineering team to decompose science objectives into requirements to guide the 
architecture, concept design, and technology development. 
b. Perform the necessary science analyses to validate an architecture’s and concept design’s given 
performance with the developing technologies.  
c. Establish a process by which new science objectives are proposed, reviewed, evaluated, and 
dispositioned (accepted or rejected) by the project. The evaluation would necessarily need to consult 
the other Pre-Phase A project office areas of engineering, technology, and architecture to determine its 
impact(s) if implemented (science value, cost, and risk) on the overall mission. As noted earlier, 
attempting to establish the value of any changes needs to be weighed in the context of knowing that 
changes in later parts of the flagship’s development can ripple through and cause cost and schedule 
overruns. Therefore, another responsibility of the SSC will be to protect the science requirements from 
external pressures to change the mission scope once they have been established by the end of Phase A. 
d. Support the engineers in resolving all TBDs and TBRs  for the engineering requirements which will be 
enabled by establishing science requirements earlier and holding to them, to minimize science creep. 
 
C. Architecture, Concept Development, and Long-term Planning:  A group of discipline engineers led by the 
Project Systems Engineer (“Lead Systems Engineer”), will be responsible for maturing the architecture and 
studying concept designs commensurate with the science objectives and developing technologies.  
 
In addition, the architecture team will perform trades relevant to the architecture and designs. The trades will be 
weighed against science, execution feasibility, cost, risk, as well as the demands each architecture trade places 
on the ground verification and validation and I&T process including systems engineering integrated modeling 
tools, facilities, ground transportation, ground support equipment (GSE) (optical, electrical, thermal, and 
mechanical GSE), contamination control requirements, meeting launch vehicle survival vibration and load 
requirements, and ease of access to subsystems and subassemblies during I&T via a modular design which also 
enables serviceability. These and more need to be considered when designing a flagship mission3, 78.   
 
All missions that have used engineering breadboard units, pathfinders, engineering development units (EDUs), 
and engineering test units (ETUs), recount that the time and resources invested during the formulation period 
(Phases A and B) to develop and learn from them were vastly smaller than the time and resources that would be 
encountered and expended if they were learned during I&T on the critical path on the flight unit. Different types 
of practice units enabled and ultimately, saved on their mission’s cost and schedule performance3, 33-44, 52-60, 74, 75. 
These units allowed the team to catch early what would have been disasters if caught late during system-level 
I&T on the critical path on the flight unit. The architecture team should plan out which types of practice units 
are needed on which pieces of critical hardware. Judicious selection and development of engineering 
breadboards, pathfinders, engineering development units (EDUs) and engineering test units (ETUs) to simulate 
the function of the eventual flight hardware helps validate designs and requirements and helps inform 
integration and test procedures.   
 
The goal of the Pre-Phase A project office is to mature the most known risk drivers of the mission concept to 
the point where most, if not all known risks are mitigated to the most extent possible. This will position and 
enable the execution of Phases A through D to address the known challenges with less risk.  Executing these 
activities in Pre-Phase A will enable the remainder of the formulation and implementation phases to only have 
to deal with unknown risks. Figure 6 below pictorially depicts the goal of Pre-Phase A.  
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Figure 6: This shows how the science, architecture, concept design, and technology converge prior to entering Phase A, 
increasing the likelihood of a successful Phase A. 
 
The Pre-Phase A project office may look similar to the one depicted in Figure 7:   
 
 
Figure 7:  While this is labeled for LUVOIR, establishing a Pre-Phase A project office for any NASA flagship is 
recommended. The project office coordinates all of the activities to develop each area and coordinates across each area 
given their dependence on one another. 
 
Two independent cost estimates are performed: (1) the mission to obtain a more accurate mission cost; (2) the next 
block of funding. A review is held before the mission can pass into the next funding block. 
 
4.5.2 Funding Block 2:  Phase A – (Part 1 of 3) milestones and exit criteria: 
 
Phase A is split up into three separate funding blocks for funding different products and milestones. At the 
beginning of Funding Block 2, all technologies have been demonstrated to TRL6 including subscale system 
demonstrations, the science objectives are defined, and the architecture and concept designs have been demonstrated 
at the system-level. During Funding Block 2, the science requirements are flowed down to engineering and mission 
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requirements to the subsystem level (See Figure 1 in this paper). The subsystem level requirements must establish 
and define performance requirements, acceptance testing requirements, interface requirements, and rules that will be 
followed during the next higher level of integration to name a few. These subsystem requirements definitions must 
be part of the selection criteria in the RFP call documentation. As discussed in Section 2.1.6, the LUVOIR Team 
envisions the government as the prime to establish all requirements as early as possible. The government can then 
issue RFPs to leverage industry, academia, and international partners in their areas of expertise as early as possible. 
The RFPs are issued competitively at the subsystem level. The actual RFPs would not be released until the start of 
Funding Block 3. The exit criteria for Funding Block 2 is for NASA to be ready to release the RFPs. “Ready for 
release” means all requirements mentioned above are clear, complete, and have been reviewed and approved by 
stakeholders.  
 
At the end of funding block 2, two independent cost estimates are performed: (1) the mission cost; (2) the next block 
of funding. At this point, the mission cost estimate should be more accurate. A review is held before the mission can 
pass into the next funding block. 
 
4.5.3 Funding Block 3:  Phase A – (Part 2 of 3) milestones and exit criteria: 
 
Funding Block 3 begins with releasing all RFPs. During funding block 3 (FB3), the requirements are refined and 
formal interface agreements between segments, elements, and subsystems are made. In the latter half of funding 
block 3, the subsystem proposals are received, evaluated, and awarded. Given the acquisition is at the subsystem 
level, once the partners are onboard, they define all lower-level requirements within their subsystems.  
 
The required exit criteria for Funding Block 3 are: (1) ensure the release of the subsystem RFPs at the beginning of 
FB3; (2) refine all requirements and formalize all interface agreements between all segments, elements, and 
subsystems; (3) evaluate and make award selections for all subsystems from the received proposals; (4) all partners 
are required to flow all subsystem-level requirements down to their assemblies, sub-assemblies and components. By 
the end of funding block 3, all requirements at all hardware and software levels must be established and defined; and   
(5) The mission successfully passes its Systems Requirements Review (SRR) 
 
At the end of funding block 3, two independent cost estimates are performed: (1) the mission cost; (2) the next block 
of funding. A review is held before the mission can pass into the next funding block. 
 
4.5.4 Funding Block 4:  Phase A – (Part 3 of 3) milestones and exit criteria: 
 
Funding Block 4 is the third and last funding block within Phase A. Funding block 4 begins and completes 
assembly-level design and analysis. Assembly-level fabrication is well underway.  
 
The required exit criteria for Funding Block 4 includes meeting the normal NASA Key Decision Point-B (KDP-B) 
entrance criteria following the standards as defined in NASA Procedural Requirements document on NASA Space 
Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, NPR 7120.5E.   
 
At the end of funding block 4, two independent cost estimates are performed: (1) the mission cost; (2) the next block 
of funding. A review is held before the mission can pass into the next funding block. 
 
4.5.5 Funding Block 5:  Phase B milestones and exit criteria: 
 
Funding Block 5 funds all of Phase B. Assembly-level fabrication and integration and testing is completed. Sub-
system-level integration is well underway. The mission must pass the mission Preliminary Design Review (PDR). 
This is the final funding block during NASA’s formulation period. The mission prepares for NASA’s Key Decision 
Point-C (KDP-C). 
 
The required exit criteria for Funding Block 5 (Phase B) is to pass PDR and meet all of the normal KDP-C entrance 
criteria following the standards as defined in NASA Procedural Requirements document on NASA Space Flight 
Program and Project Management Requirements, NPR 7120.5E.   
 
At the end of funding block 5, the final two independent cost estimates are performed: (1) the mission cost; (2) the 
next block of funding. A review is held before the mission can pass into this final funding block. 
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4.5.6 Funding Block 6:  Phases C and D milestones and exit criteria: 
 
The final funding Block (Funding Block 6) is the final funding block to fully fund Phases C and D, NASA’s 
Implementation Period. This will allow the full funding necessary for the project to follow the optimized IMS. This 
will enable the project to deliver a launch ready observatory, launch, and complete mission commissioning by the 
end of Phase D.   
 
Following the steps outlined in this integrated development and funding framework would enable significant 
improvements for NASA’s flagships to deliver on cost and schedule.  
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has recounted the marvel and incredibly enlightening surprises that NASA’s flagship missions discover 
and their impact on NASA and humanity. NASA’s flagships are arguably, equal to, if not more profoundly 
significant national-assets given they are each one-offs and given their world-renowned popularity and enthusiasm 
in all corners of the Earth. We would like to see NASA’s flagships be recognized as on par in difficulty, complexity, 
and value compared to other government agency national assets. Due to NASA’s flagship scientific discovery 
potential, they all receive significant international contributions, thus, they are also peaceful manifestation of 
positive international cooperation. We would like to see NASA continue to pursue audaciously bold queries into: 
how the universe began; where its headed; how the universe operates; how planets form; whether or not Earth, the 
only pale blue dot we’ve ever known in our vast universe, is alone; contextually, how similar or different is our solar 
system from other nearby ones; and be able to remotely monitor our solar system planetary bodies with imaging 
capabilities equal to in-situ spacecraft3.  
 
This paper has also recounted in detail the repeatedly-documented, lessons-learned/-observed systemic-challenges 
for NASA’s flagship missions. By implementing the proactive, integrated development and funding framework 
described herein, we believe that NASA’s flagships can be developed with significantly better cost and schedule 
performance. In turn, this may engender trust from its stakeholders and allow NASA’s flagships to be revitalized 
with enthusiasm from the community. 
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